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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
regulations in the public interest, the test being whether or not the regula-
tion goes further than throwing a reasonable safeguard around the exercise
of the right." Riley v. Chambers, above.
The decision in the principal case is in harmony with the general attitude
of the courts toward the regulation of this occupation which is well ex-
pressed by the Payne v. Volkman case, in which the court said, "Although
such a statute is drastic we cannot say that it is unconstitutional."
H. V. C., '31.
CONsTITuTIOAL LAw-POwER OF CITY TO LICENSE SOFT DRINK PAR-
LORS.-The proprietor of a grocery in Milwaukee was recently prosecuted
under an ordinance of the city for selling flavored soda water, containing
no alcoholic content, without obtaining the license required by the enact-
ment. On appeal by the city from an acquittal in the court of first
instance the issue was taken to the State Supreme Court, which declared
the ordinance in question unconstitutional. City of Milwaukee v. Meyer
(Wis. 1929) 224 N. W. 106.
By express provision in its charter the city had the power to regulate
saloons, groceries and other places where spirituous, vinous or fermented
liquors were sold or given away. Likewise, by state enactment, a license
was required of all sellers of non-intoxicating but alcohol-containing liquors
and beverages. The ordinance here involved was as follows: "No person,
unless licensed [under state enactment] to sell non-intoxicating liquors,
shall sell nonalcoholic beverages without a license to be granted by the
common council in its discretion." Nonalcoholic drinks were defined as all
flavored drinks commonly referred to as soft drinks, containing no alco-
holic content. A license fee of five dollars per annum was fixed.
In declaring such an enactment unconstitutional the court seems to base
its decision in the main upon the theory that an express grant of legislative
power is a condition precedent to the validity of a municipal ordinance, and
any attempted exercise of power must be brought within a reasonable con-
struction of such a grant. That in itself is no doubt a valid position, but
the application of that rule to void the ordinance here involved seems ques-
tionable at best. By statute the common council of the city was granted
the power "to act for the government and good order of the city, for its
commercial benefit, and for the health, safety, and welfare of the public,
and may carry out its powers by license, regulation, suppression, borrow-
ing of money, tax levy, appropriation, fine, imprisonment, and other neces-
sary or convenient means. The powers hereby conferred shall be in ad-
dition to all other grants, and shall be limited only by express language."
Wis. Stat. (1927) sec. 62.11 (5). In view of this most general and liberal
grant of power the holding of the court that the ordinance in question can-
not be upheld as within the power of the common council seems erroneous.
It would seem that the exercise of power by the council herein should be
sustained as -rithin a reasonable construction of the grant.
A much earlier case in the same jurisdiction was authority for the ruling
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that an ordinance restricting the sale and giving away of lemonade, directed
primarily at open air concessions, was void as an unwarranted interference
with a harmless commodity. Barling v. West (1871) 29 Wis. 307. It seems
to have been rather generally held that a general grant of powers is not
enough to support an ordinance forbidding the sale of certain non-intoxi-
cating liquors. Such legislation, unless it can be justified as tending to
prevent offenses, or preserve the public health, morals, safety or general
welfare, is usually held to be an invasion of private rights of property.
Chicago v. Netcher (1899) 183 Ill. 104, 55 N. E. 707; Tolliver v. Blizzard
(1911) 143 Ky. 773, 137 S. W. 230; Westville v. Rainwater (1920) 294
Ill. 409, 128 N. E. 492. But that is by no means conclusive authority for
the decision in question. These enactments prohibited, or so restricted as
to practically prohibit, the sale of the commodity itself, while this ordinance
was a mere license requirement. In view of the modern thought regard-
ing the necessity for regulations to protect the general health it is con-
ceivable that opposite holdings might result today in some jurisdiction
even in cases of restrictive ordinances.
A recent case which seems at first glance to be directly parallel, in facts
and decision, with the one at bar, is found, on close examination, not to be
authority in support of the Wisconsin decision. Village of Kincaid V. Vecehi
(1928) 332 Ill. 586, 164 N. E. 199. The license required there was for
those who "sold or gave away" soft drinks. The absurdity of such an in-
clusive enactment is apparent. And it is to be further noted that the
statutory grant of powers in that case was much narrower than in the
principal case. Ill. Rev. Stat. (Cahill, 1929) c. 24, sees. 46, 65, 66, 78, 91.
The vocation of selling soda water and soft drinks has been held a proper
subject of police regulation because it affects the general health and wel-
fare. Kirby v. Paragould (1923) 159 Ark. 29, 251 S. W. 374. The right
of a municipal corporation to enact reasonable ordinances classifying soft
drinks and to provide one license fee for those containing any per cent of
alcohol, and another license fee for the sale of those containing no alcohol
whatever has been recognized. Bradford v. Kirby (1911) 142 Ky. 820,
135 S. W. 290; McQuillan, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (1928) III, 190. And
it has been held also that the fact that an ordinance regulating the sale of
beverages includes drinks outside those specified in legislative grants of
power is not fatal to the enactment. Chicago v. Murphy (1924) 313 Ill.
98, 144 N. E. 802. The ordinance here would seem, in view of these hold-
ings, to be valid.
A comparison of this decision with a few other recent decisions in similar,
though not directly analogous, situations also indicates that the Wisconsin
decision is to be questioned. Ordinance provisions requiring a license of
theatres, dance halls and such places of amusement have been generally
held to be within the police power of a city. Bielecki v. City of Port Arthur
(Tex. 1929) 2 S. W. (2d) 1001; City of Metropolis v. Gibbons (1929) 334
Il1. 431, 166 N. E. 115. Public health has been held to justify regulation
and license of laundries. Ruban v. Chicago (1928) 330 Ill. 97, 161 N. E.
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133. State statutes imposing a license tax on soft drink retailers have
been upheld. Wingfield v. South Carolina Tax Commission (1928) 147
S. C. 116, 144 S. E. 846. It is true that ordinances requiring a license for
persons in certain occupations have at times been declared invalid, but
such holdings seem to be based upon a specific conflict with statutory pro-
visions or else qualified by the particular circumstances in issue. City of
Lubbock v. Magnolia Petroleum Co. (Tex. 1928) 6 S. W. (2d) 80; Case-
Fowler Lumber Co. v. Winslett (Ga. 1929) 149 S. E. 211; People W.
Hervieux (App. Div. 1929) 236 N. Y. S. 129. C. V. E., '31.
CONTRACTS-MUTUALITY OF OBLIGATION IN ADVERTISING AGREEMENTS.-
An advertising agency entered into three "contracts" with a publisher
whereby the latter was authorized to publish certain advertising matter in
its three newspapers. The space was to be used in one year from the date
of the first insertion and to be paid for at a stated price. Both parties
properly signed the "contracts." The agency never did furnish the copy
and there was no first insertion. The publisher sued for damages for
failure to perform. Held, that defendant, the advertising agency, was not
required to make such insertion, was not bound by the "contracts," and that
the so-called contracts could not be enforced for want of mutuality. All
Church Press, Inc. v. E. C. Harris Advertising Agency, Inc. (1927) 36 Ga.
App. 616, 138 S. E. 85
Mutuality of obligation is not an essential element in every contract
since a promise by one person is merely one of the kinds of consideration
that will support a promise by another. 6 R. C. L. 686, sec. 93. But where
there is no consideration for a contract except the mutual promises of
parties, the contract is not binding on one party unless it is also binding
on the other. Pope v. Thompson (1920) 171 Wis. 468, 177 N. W. 607;
Bernstein v. W. B. Mfg. Co. (1920) 235 Mass. 425, 126 N. E. 796; Miami
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Orange-Crush Co. (D. C. S. D. Fla. 1923) 291 F.
102; 1 Williston, CONTRACTS (1920), sec. 103e. Here the only possible con-
sideration to support the promise of the publisher was a binding promise
on the part of the advertising agency. But there was no such express
promise in writing, and the court failed to find any grounds for implying
one. The reasoning of the court is sound and certainly from the stand-
point of the substantive law of contracts there is nothing startling about
the decision. The case is followed by Haverty Furniture Co. v. Lyon-Young
Printing Co. (1927) 37 Ga. App. 263, 139 S. E. 921.
The unenforceable "contracts" involved in the main case are thoroughly
typical of advertising agreements being entered into every day. They were
drawn without any regard to the incorporation of mutually binding prom-
ises, and they illustrate perfectly the "mutuality pitfall" which renders
such agreements unenforceable. Though many details were provided for
in the agreement it contained no binding promise on defendant to do any-
thing. Publishers in particular should be interested to know that courts
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